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MUCH ADO ABOUT SOME THINGS:
FOURTH AMENDMENT RULINGS DOMINATE
THE SUPREME COURT'S CRIMINAL LAW
DECISIONS IN THE 2000 TERM
William E. Hellerstein'
The United State Supreme Court's criminal law cases last
term were heavily dominated by Fourth Amendment issues.
There were seven decisions in the Fourth Amendment area.
After the events of September 1 lth, it is obvious to all of us how
relevant the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is, and will be, with
respect to searches and seizures. Also in the criminal law area
there were two cases pertaining to the assistance of counsel that I
will discuss, one case concerning sentencing, one case concerning
the Ex Post Facto Clause, one case concerning the Double
Jeopardy clause, one involving the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, and finally, one case concerning the
death penalty.
I. FouRTH AMENDMENT CASES
Kyllo v. United States
The first case, Kyllo v. United States,2 involved a search
using thermal imaging. The facts are quite simple. The police,
believing that Mr. Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home,
used a thermal imaging device outside the house to scan it and
determine whether certain heat patterns were emanating from it.
3
Based on the positive response from the thermal imaging device,
the police applied for a warrant to search the home. While
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Brooklyn College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; Professor Hellerstein teaches Constitutional Law, Civil
Rights Law, and Criminal Procedure. He is an expert in criminal law and
constitutional litigation, and has argued numerous appeals before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals.
2 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3 Id. at 29.
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executing the warrant they found marijuana.4 In a five to four
decision, with a very interesting change of role, the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, holding that the use of a thermal
imaging device to detect heat patterns in someone's home is a
search, and must be performed pursuant to a warrant based upon
probable cause.5 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court
and Justice Stevens wrote a vehement dissent.
Essentially, the Court held that when the government uses
a device that is not in "general public use" to explore the details
of a home previously unknowable without a physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a search, and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant. 6 To fully understand this decision, we must
look at the Katz decision of 1967. 7 We, being the defense side of
things, thought Kyllo was an open and shut case based upon the
Katz decision. In 1967, when the Court departed from the old
common law trespass concept of what constituted a search,
Justice Stewart said the Fourth Amendments protects people, not
places, in their expectation of privacy. 9  Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion stated that for a person to have an expectation
of privacy, "the expectation must be one that society is willing to
recognize as reasonable." 10 Now, who is society? As the Katz
case evolves, society has been, and will remain, five justices of
the United States Supreme Court, who determine what our




7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
& U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
9 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
'0 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol 18
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In post-Katz cases like the garbage case1 1 and the fly-over
cases, 12 the Court determined that we, as citizens, do not have
expectations of privacy in our garbage or in our backyards when
the police fly over us. Justice Scalia, in Kyllo, acknowledged that
the Katz test has become circular. ' 3 Nonetheless, he said that this
case is different because it involved a home.1 4 He said that we
have always had an expectation of privacy in our homes, and
using a device such as a thermal imaging scanner constitutes a
search. 1s
Kyllo is extremely significant because of the scope of the
language in Justice Scalia's opinion. It is not a decision limited
to the specific device employed in the case because the Court
stated that the rule it adopted took into account other, more
sophisticated, systems in use or in development.' 6  The Court
said that the homeowner is not to be left to the "mercy of
1 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that a
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when leaving garbage
out on the curb because "society" does not have an expectation of privacy in
trash left on the curb for collection, due to the fact that it is accessible to
anyone. As such, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the warrantless search and seizure of an individual's garbage when left on a
curb).
12 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448-52 (1989) (holding that a police
officer who obtained a warrant by observing an individual's property by
helicopter after the officer could not view the property from the ground, was
not in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the defendant could not
reasonably have believed that his greenhouse could not have been seen by a
helicopter flying overhead, and concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not
require the police to obtain a warrant for naked eye observations, even in an
aircraft); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209-14 (1986) (holding
that a warrantless, naked-eye observation by a police officer who obtained an
airplane to view an individual's backyard, because of an anonymous telephone
tip reporting the individual was growing marijuana, did not violate the
individual's Fourth Amendment right, reasoning that this expectation of
privacy is not what "society is prepared to honor").
" Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 35-36; see also id. at 36 n.3 (describing projects already underway
by law enforcement to see through walls and other barriers).
2001
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expanding technology." 17 If it is thermal imaging today, it could
be a more sophisticated technology very shortly. The open
questions are: What other types of technology? It can vary. What
is the meaning of "in general public use" and how can that serve
as a criterion? Many things are deemed to be "in general public
use." Justice Stevens' main point in his dissent was that this
search was "off the wall," not "through the wall," and so there
is a metaphysical issue as well.18
It must be considered that several years ago the Court, in
United States v. Place,'9 held that a dog sniffing a person's
luggage was not a search. If the Court holds that something is
not a search, then the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable, because
the Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 20 Despite the fact that you think your
luggage is an "effect" 21 and is subject to privacy, the Court
disagreed; Fido, the trained dog, can sniff your luggage.
After the decision in Kyllo, I do not know whether the
police can have Fido the dog come by your front door and sniff
for drugs. Perhaps the dog is all right, but the thermal imager is
not. The dog's nose is as good as the thermal imager at close
range. However, the Court is not talking about thermal imaging
alone, and it will be interesting to see how the Court reacts to
other technologies, such as those that detect odors.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
Another critically important case from this past term is
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.22 Edmond is another of what I
call the "special needs" line of search cases; however, Edmond
came up short in qualifying in that category.23 The City of
1d. at 35.
18 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19 462 U.S. 696, 697-98 (1983).
20 Id. at 707.
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ( "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects. . . .
22 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
231 Id. at 47.
[Vol 18
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Indianapolis decided to have a highway checkpoint program to
detect, not drunk drivers, which had already been upheld by the
Supreme Court in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 24 but a
checkpoint program to detect drug use or possession. 25 At the
checkpoints dogs would come by and sniff the car.26 Here the
Court in a five to four decision, held that this was
unconstitutional. 27
The Court explained that special needs cases represent a
category of cases in which there is no requirement of suspicion in
order to search.28 The need to search is based on needs that go
"beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 29  Some
examples of this first category of special needs cases include:
urine testing for high school athletes, which was upheld in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton;30 urine testing of treasury
employees in Customs Service, which was upheld in National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab;31 and post accident drug
and alcohol tests, which were upheld in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives, the companion case to Von Raab.32 Some other
special needs cases involved fixed checkpoints. United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte involved a checkpoint within a hundred miles of
the Mexican border.33 A fixed checkpoint looking for illegal
aliens, not a border checkpoint, was upheld by the Supreme
24 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (reasoning that balancing the State's interest in
protecting citizens from drunk drivers against the "intrusion upon individual
motorists who are briefly stopped," weighs in favor of the State's interest in
protecting the public, thus not violating the Fourth Amendment).
25 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
26 Id. at 35.
21 Id. at 48.
28 Id. at 37.
29Id. at48.
30 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (holding that due to the decreased expectation of
privacy of students, the "relative unobtrusiveness of the search," and the
severity of the need satisfied by the search, the policy was constitutional).
31 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (holding that "testing of employees who apply
for promotion to positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs,
or to positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm, is reasonable").
32 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
" 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
2001
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Court because it was for the purpose of finding illegal aliens, and
not to enforce a criminal law.34 The closest case, factually, to
Edmond was the sobriety checkpoint case, Sitz, where the Court
said the sobriety checkpoint is not for criminal purposes, but for
public safety.35
However, the Edmond Court held that the stopping of a
car at a fixed checkpoint, without individualized suspicion, for
the purpose of drug detection is not permissible. 36 Essentially,
the purpose of the checkpoint was to uncover criminal
wrongdoing and to search for evidence of crime. The Court
reasoned that if the use of checkpoints is expanded for the
purpose of enforcing the criminal law, then the Fourth
Amendment must apply. 37 Therefore, the line of cases that the
Court had upheld as special needs cases were distinguished.
Justice Rehnquist, for the four dissenting Justices, stated
that this case "follows naturally from Martinez-Fuerte and
Sitz. 38 One plus one should equal two. One, Sitz says you can
have a drunk-driving checkpoint, 39 and Martinez-Fuerte upheld a
fixed checkpoint.4° So fixed checkpoints are permissible. And,
two, according to the Place case, a dog can sniff.42 Hence, he
reasoned, one plus one equals two; it should be okay to take a
14 Id. at 556-57.
35 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447.36 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
37 Id. at 41 ("We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our
checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule
that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized
suspicion").
38 Id. at 50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
39 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447.40 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-57.
41 id.
42 Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98.
[Vol 18
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dog to a checkpoint to sniff.4 3 However, five Justices disagreed
and held the other way.44
Justice Thomas' dissent is worth mentioning. He
frequently writes a dissent if the Court holds in favor of the
defendant. Here, however, he dissented only because he could
not distinguish Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. He believed those
two cases were decided wrongly and that sobriety checkpoints
should not be allowed.46 However, because he could not
distinguish them here, he also did not think the Court had
distinguished them, and thus he criticized the majority for its
analysis .
Ferguson v. City of Charleston
A second special needs case decided this term that also
came up short was Ferguson v. City of Charleston.48 Here, the
petitioners were pregnant women patients who were arrested after
they tested positive for cocaine.49  A urine test had been
conducted on the women by the hospital pursuant to an agreement
between it and the Charleston Police Department.50 Testing
positive for cocaine resulted in the women being charged with
drug possession or endangering a minor, unless they agreed to go
to a drug abuse program.51 Thus they were forced to deal with
their drug problems and their children or face criminal charges.
The Supreme Court said, however, that urine testing has always
qualified as a search and, therefore, the search must be
41 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 48 ("Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint
program is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment").
41 Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46 Id. ("I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would
have considered 'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals
not suspected of wrongdoing.")
47 id.
48 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
49 1d. at73.
0 Id. at 71-73.
t Id. at 73.
2001
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reasonable .52 Law enforcement was the purpose of the testing. 5
The Court held that the arrest and the use of the coercive aspects
of prosecution for a crime, to achieve what might be a normal,
legitimate social purpose of getting pregnant mothers off drugs,
nevertheless, ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment because the
direct effect was a criminal prosecution.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,55 is the next Fourth
Amendment case, which I refer to as "The Soccer Mom Case."
The son of a very dear friend and longtime colleague, who is a
Judge of the Supreme Court, Bronx County, has a son, Kenneth.
He just finished a clerkship with Justice Souter, whom I greatly
admire and respect. Kenneth called me a couple of weeks ago to
ask me for a favor. I said "Kenneth, if you tell me you had
nothing to do with Justice Souter's opinion in the Atwater case I
will do anything you want." He said, "That wasn't me, that was
the other clerk; but mostly it was Justice Souter." I asked,
"What happened to Justice Souter here?" Let me tell you why.
This is a § 198356 suit brought by Ms. Atwater, who was
stopped by an officer of the town of Lago Vista, with a
population of about two to three thousand people.57 She and her
52 Id. at 76; see also Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 ("We recognized in Skinner
that collecting the samples for urinalysis intrudes upon "an excretory function
traditionally shielded by great privacy.") (citations omitted).
53 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
14 Id. at 82-84.
" 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
56 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
57 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324-25.
[Vol 18
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children were not wearing seat belts.58 Generally, you can not go
to prison for not having your children in seatbelts, but the officer
arrested Ms. Atwater anyway. She was taken to the Lago Vista
jail where she was searched, had her shoes removed, and was put
in a cell. 59  The issue was whether this conduct was an
unreasonable seizure. The police had the authority to arrest her,
but were not required to.
60
Being arrested for such a minor offense, as defined by
state law, raised serious Fourth Amendment seizure questions. In
a five to four decision, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not forbid a warrantless arrest for this type of minor
criminal offense. 61 The first battleground in the case was the
common law. The Court often considers the common law of
England when deciding Fourth Amendment issues; in fact, one
could argue, perhaps too much. Therefore, it is important to
look at several cases that preceded Atwater.
In United States v. Watson,62 the Court held that an
officer may make an arrest in public without a warrant.63 Justice
Powell, who wrote a concurring opinion, said that as a matter of
logic the decision does not make any sense because the Fourth
Amendment secures equally persons, papers, effects and places.
64
He argued that if you are going to have a probable cause
requirement, the seizure of a person should be treated similarly to
a search of a home because there is no distinction between the
two in the language of the Fourth Amendment. 65 The Court in
Watson, however, relying on the common law of arrest, held that
constables could always make arrests in public without
58 Id. at 323-24.
59 Id. at 324 (Atwater was arrested and transported to jail where she was told
to remove her shoes, jewelry, eyeglasses and empty her pockets. Her "mug
shot" was taken and then she was placed in a cell for about an hour).
60Id. at 326.
61 id.
62 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
63 Id. at 423.
64 Id. at 428-29 (Powell, J. concurring).
65 Id. at 429 ("Logic therefore, would seem to dictate that arrests be subject
to the warrant requirement at least to the same extent as searches.").
2001
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warrants.66 Justice Marshall dissented.67  The Justices were
sharply divided on this issue. In his concurring opinion in
Watson, Justice Powell said that the history of the common law
controls, and even though it was illogical to treat the seizure of a
person less meaningfully than the search of a home, he said,
"But, sometimes logic must defer to history and experience."
68
The case turned, I think, largely on the common law of England
because all of the heavy common law hitters, such as Blackstone
and Hale, said you could arrest without a warrant.69
The next case was Payton v. New York, which involved an
arrest without a warrant in the home.7° I argued Payton, and we
believed that Justice Powell had to be persuaded that the common
law with respect to arrests in the home was different from the
power to arrest in public without a warrant as in Watson.
Blackstone, Hale, and other big-name commentators were not on
our side. 71 However, others such as Dalton, Country Justice, and
Sir Edwin Coke supported our view that a warrant was
required.72 The common law was a wash,73 and the Court in
Payton, six to three, held that a warrant is necessary for an arrest
in the home.74
In Payton our common law presentation greatly influenced
the outcome. Now comes Atwater. Ms. Atwater's common law
argument was stronger than was ours in Payton. Unlike in
Payton, she had on her side the great Sir William Blackstone, Sir
66 Id. at 418 (stating "the ancient common-law rule [was] that a peace officer
was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony
committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.").
67 Watson, 423 U.S. at 438 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority's reliance on the common law rule is misplaced since "as a matter of
doctrine, the longstanding existence of a Government practice does not
immunize the practice from scrutiny under the mandate of our Constitution.").
68 Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
69 id
70 445 U.S. 573, 574 (1980).
71 Id. at 590 n.30.
72 Id. at 593-97.
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James Fitzjames Stephen, Glanville Williams, and Sir Matthew
Hale. All of those commentators said that, for the most part,
only misdemeanors which also breached the peace justified
warrantless arrests .75  This caused Justice Souter to rely
considerably on certain Elizabethan era statutes that dispensed
with a warrant for non-breach of the peace misdemeanors.76 But
the weakness of his argument is evident from his citation to one
such statute that made it a misdemeanor to be a "night-walker"
and authorized a warrantless arrest for that offense.7 7 But what
else could the constable do under the law? If a person was a
"night walker" and was not arrested, he would continue to walk
in the night.
Although Justice Souter recognized that the common law
history did not really support his argument, he concluded that
what the police did to Ms. Atwater was constitutionally
acceptable because he did not think that the Framers were
particularly concerned with the issue and that subsequent to the
Constitution's ratification, state statutes did not limit warrantless
arrests to misdemeanors which also breached the peace. 78 He did
so despite his own belief that what the police officer did to Ms.
Atwater was terrible in that "the physical incidents of arrest were
merely gratuitous humiliations," served no purpose, and brought
discredit to the City of Lago Vista.79 I emphasize that this
comment was made, not in the dissent, but in Justice Souter's
opinion for the Court. Nonetheless, Justice Souter reasoned that
if the Court found for Ms. Atwater, then the police would have to
figure out the proper procedures for all kinds of minor offenses.
Rather than have that, the Court wanted a bright-line rule by
75 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 327-30. Atwater's argument was essentially that the
common law prohibited peace officers from making warrantless misdemeanor
arrests, except in cases involving a breach of the peace.
76 Id. at 333 (citing 1285 'Statutes at Large' 3 Edw. I. Ch.4 §§ 5-6).
77 id.
78 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 338-40 ("We simply cannot conclude that the Fourth
Amendment, as originally understood, forbade peace officers to arrest without
a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the
peace. ")
79 Id. at 346-47
2001
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which the police could be guided so they would not have to go to
the books or think too hard. Consequently, the Court disdained a
case-by-case balancing test.80
Justice Souter also concluded that there is no real problem
of police abuse in this context that required a different result.8'
He pointed to the fact that Atwater's counsel could only cite one
case in which the police had overreached in exercising their arrest
powers for a very minor offense. That was an instance where
police officers in the District of Columbia arrested a young girl
for the "crime" of eating McDonald's fries in the subway,8 2 My
colleague, Professor Susan Herman, who wrote the ACLU brief
in Atwater, cited eight such cases; including one which involved a
New York City arrest for riding a bicycle without a bell on it.
83
Thus, Justice Souter concluded that the absence of many cases of
abuse "out there" was yet another reason for holding that the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement did not, in
this context, require greater attention from the Court.84 This
made me wonder whether Justice Souter was a Sherlock Holmes
aficionado and I concluded that he probably was not. Otherwise,
he could have pondered whether the absence of instances of
warrantless arrests for trivial offenses actually was significant in
the same way that, in the Sherlock Holmes tale, the dog did not
bark was.8 5
Precisely because the police do not usually make arrests
for minor offenses, akin to Ms. Atwater's, is it not the absence of
police abuse of their arrest powers that takes on greater meaning
'0 Id. at 347-50.
8) Id. at 353.
82 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 n.23.
"' Id. at 353 n.24.
4 Id. at 351 (stating that "it leads one to wonder whether warrantless
misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention").
85 See 1 SIR ARTHUR C. DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK
HOLMES 335, 347 (Doubleday & Co., N.Y. 1990)(1922). The passage is as
follows:
"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
[Vol 18
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when they treat a person as Ms. Atwater was treated? I would
submit that it is the departure from the norm that renders the
police conduct in Atwater, in Fourth Amendment terms,
"unreasonable". However, Justice Souter is from New
Hampshire, a pastoral environment, and Lago Vista may be
similarly categorized. But what about New York City?
86
In dissent, Justice O'Connor said, wait a minute, we have
to balance.8 7 She pointed out that when they make an arrest the
police have the power to search incident to the arrest and to
conduct the inventory search that goes along with it.88 Further,
she added, in Whren v. United States,89 the Court held that the
use of a pretext to stop someone for a traffic infraction to search
for drugs was acceptable, and that the Fourth Amendment does
not require any inquiry into motive. 90 She argued that to allow
the police to arrest for seat belt violations or bicycles without
bells raises the question of whether such conduct is really what
concerns the police. 9' She also noted that the racial profiling
cases show the power to arrest is serious business.92 Therefore,
Justice O'Connor argued that the only standard needed to govern
police conduct is that a police officer should be required to
demonstrate that the arrest he made was for a needful purpose.
To give the police carte blanche to arrest misdemeanants merely
86 New York City recently settled a $50 million class action suit brought by
misdemeanant arrestees who had been subjected to unlawful strip searches.
There were at least 50,000 plaintiffs in the class. See Benjamin Weiser, New
York Will Pay $50 Million In 50,000 Illegal Strip Searches, N.Y. TIMES,
January 10, 2001, at Al.
87 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
90 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Whren, 517
U.S. at 818, where the Court held that the subjective intent of the police
officer was not a pertinent consideration in determining the reasonableness of a
traffic stop and that "the making of a traffic stop ... is governed by the usual
rule that probable cause to believe the law has been broken 'outbalances'
private interest in avoiding police contact.")
91 Id. at 371-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2001
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The issue in the next case, Illinois v. McArthur, involved
the seizure of a home while the police sought a search warrant.
94
This was an eight to one decision.95 Not a very significant case,
but the decision solves an important piece of the Fourth
Amendment puzzle. Mr. McArthur was having a problem with
his wife. 96 She called the police for assistance in removing her
belongings from their home and after she cleared out her things,
she told them that her husband had "dope in there." 97 The police
believed they had probable cause, but they also knew they had to
get a warrant. The police then kept McArthur from entering his
house for two hours while they obtained a search warrant.
98
McArthur argued that his house could not be "seized" without.a
warrant. 99
In contrast with Atwater, the Court, this time, said it
would balance the privacy interests of the individual against law
enforcement concerns. 100 First, the Court pointed out that the
police had reason to believe the wife because she had firsthand
knowledge that there were drugs on the premises.' 0' Second, the
police also had good reason to fear that if McArthur went back
into the house he would destroy the evidence. 10 2 Third, the police
tried to reconcile McArthur's privacy interest in his home; they
93 Id. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001).
9 Id. at 327.
96d. at 328.
97 Id. at 328-29.
9 Id. at 329.
99 McArthur, 531 U.S. at. 329.
100 Id. at 331 ("rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we
balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine
if the intrusion was reasonable.").
'o' Id. at 331-32.
102 Id. at 332.
[Vol 18
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 18 [2002], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss1/6
FOURTH AMENDMENT RULINGS
obtained a warrant, but also kept him out of his house.' 0 3




In Arkansas v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court of Arkansas,
not a terribly liberal Fourth Amendment state court, upheld the
suppression of evidence obtained by police under a pretext
stop. 105 The police stopped Sullivan for speeding, and after
checking his identification they realized that Sullivan was
suspected of drug dealing. They then arrested him for the
speeding charge and conducted a search of his car. The search
uncovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. 0 6 Sullivan moved to
suppress the evidence on the basis that the arrest was a pretext in
order to search his vehicle.' 0 7  The trial court granted the
suppression motion, and the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed.' 0 8
The Arkansas court declined to follow the Supreme
Court's approach in Whren for two reasons. 10 9 First, the court
said that much of Whren is dicta. 110 Second, the court thought
that as the high court of a state, it had the power to construe the
United States Constitution more broadly than the Supreme
Court."'1 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
reversed, saying that the Whren case is clear regarding
103 Id.
'4 McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332-33.
105 532 U.S. 769, 770 (2001).
'06 Id. at 769-70
107 Id. at 770.
108 Id.
'09 Id. at 771
11o Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771.
111 Id. (citing the Arkansas court's assertion that "there is nothing that
prevents this court from interpreting the U.S. Constitution more broadly than
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pretexts." 12 Further, the Supreme Court refused to allow the state
court of Arkansas to tell it what the Federal Constitution says.
113
The Court went on to explain that if the Supreme Court of
Arkansas wants to do something with its state constitution, it can,
but it cannot add substantive meaning to the Fourth
Amendment. 114  Obviously, Arkansas does not like the decision
in Whren.
The significant part of Sullivan is the concurring opinion
of Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor and
Breyer.115 Justice Ginsburg sees great danger in the holding of
Atwater when it is taken in tandem with the holding in Whren.
She noted that she joined Justice O'Connor's dissent in Atwater,
questioning the reliance by the Court on the "dearth of horribles
demanding redress.'" 1 6  Thus, she offered that "if experience
demonstrates 'anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-
offense arrests,' I hope the Court will reconsider [Atwater].
" 117
So, at least four Justices have left open the possibility of looking
at Atwater again, if need be.
You should be aware that currently the Court of Appeals
of New York has at least two, perhaps three, cases raising the
issue of whether the search and seizure provisions of the New
York constitution, Article 1, Section 12,118 will be construed the
same way as the federal search and seizure provisions with
112 Id. (finding the decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court "flatly contrary"
to controlling precedent of the Supreme Court).
... Id. at 772.
"' Id. (stating "'a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards,' however, a state 'may not impose such
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court
specifically refrains from imposing them.'") (quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 719 (1975)).
"' Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 772 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
116 Id. (quoting Atwater, 352 U.S. at 353).
"17 Id. (quoting Atwater, 352 U.S. at 353).
"' N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 12. This section provides in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. .. ."
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respect to pretext arrests.1 19 Based on some of its prior decisions,
I think that the New York Court of Appeals may not be




Another open Fourth Amendment question was raised in
the case of Florida v. Thomas. 121  The Thomas case was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 22 but the issue raised in the
case will return. The issue involves the extent of the "search
incident to arrest" rule decided by the Supreme Court in New
York v. Belton.123  In Thomas, the police were investigating a
marijuana operation in a Florida home. 124 While the police were
making arrests, Mr. Thomas drove up in his car and parked in
the driveway. 125 While he went around to the back of the car, the
police checked his license and found an outstanding warrant.
26
He was arrested, handcuffed and taken into the house. 127  The
police then searched the car and found contraband. 128  The
19 U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
120 Subsequent to Professor Hellerstein's speech, on December 18, 2001, the
New York Court of Appeals decided the case of People v. Robinson, 2001 WL
1657207, and held that the New York State Constitution is to be read as
coterminous with the United States Constitution on this issue. Id. at *4. The
Court stated "we adopt Whren v. United States (517 U.S. 806) as a matter of
state law." Robinson, WL 1657207 at *1.
121 532 U.S. 774 (2001).
122 Id. at 776.
'23 Id.; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1981) (holding that
when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile).
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Florida Supreme Court held that the search of the car did not fit
within the rule articulated in Belton because Thomas was not in
the car when he was stopped by the police. 129 The Florida court
reasoned that to extend the rule in Belton to the search of
Thomas's car could conflict with the search incident doctrine as
defined by Chimel v. California.130 The case was remanded and
the Chimel issue was left to be addressed by the trial court.1
3'
Thus, there was no final order or judgment giving jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court.132 Currently, the Belton rule does not extend
to someone who is not in the car when it is stopped. Under
Belton, if a person is stopped while in the car the police can
search the entire passenger compartment and any containers in the
car. 133  Consequently, the question raised in Thomas remains
open for address in the future.
The Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has left
many people scratching their heads about the general message to
be derived from it. But one thing is becoming clear: the home,
as distinguished from cars and persons in public, is very
important and will remain strongly protected. After considering
Atwater together with the car cases, however, I told my students
to sell their cars and go naked in the streets.
129 Thomas, 532 U.S. at 776 (citing the decision below that held that the
bright-line rule articulated in Belton "is limited to situations where the law
enforcement officer initiates contact with the defendant while the defendant
remains in the car.") (citations omitted).
130 Id; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (holding that there
was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for the
police to extend a search beyond an area within which the defendant might
have obtained a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence
against him when the arrest occurred in the defendant's home).
131 Thomas, 532 U.S. at 776.
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II. OrHER SUPREME COURT CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS IN
THE CRIMINAL LAW AREA
Texas v. Cobb
The Supreme Court decided an important case regarding
the extent of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.'
1 34
The case was Texas v. Cobb, 135 which raised issues as to what
crimes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. 136  Keep
in mind that we are discussing the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and not the Fifth Amendment137 right to counsel under
Miranda v. Arizona. 138 Mr. Cobb confessed to the burglary of a
neighbor's home. 139 He was subsequently indicted for that crime,
and counsel was appointed. 140 When Cobb confessed, he told the
police that he did not know anything about what happened to the
mother and her infant who lived on the premises. 41  Fifteen
months later, Cobb's father informed the police that his son told
him he had killed both of them. 142 Cobb, who was free on bond
in the burglary case, was arrested, and the police obtained a
134 U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense."
135 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
136 Id. at 167 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense
specific and does not attach until a prosecution is commenced. Relying on its
decision in McNeil, the Court reiterated its prior holding that statements by a
defendant regarding offenses of which he was not previously charged, were
"admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel on other charged offenses.").
131 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part,
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .....
118 384 U.S. 436, 473-75 (1966) (holding that all arrestees must, among
other things, be clearly informed of their right to counsel and any waiver of
that right must be obtained knowingly and intelligently).
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Miranda waiver.1 43 During questioning, Cobb admitted that he
had stabbed the woman to death during the burglary, and that he
had buried the baby alive with its mother. 144 Not a good set of
facts from the defendant's perspective.
Cobb moved to suppress the confession on the grounds
that it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 145 The problem with the questioning was that Cobb had
already been indicted on the burglary, and, as the Supreme Court
held in McNeil v. Wisconsin,146 the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is offense specific. 147 Cobb contended that burglary was
the offense the police were questioning him about, and the
offense to which his right to counsel attached. 148 And, he argued,
the right to counsel attached also for questions about the people
who were present during the burglary. 1
49
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, reiterated
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific, but
that it does not necessarily extend to offenses factually related to
those that have been actually charged. 150  In arriving at its
decision, the Court had to side-step the case of Michigan v.
Jackson,'5' in which the Court held, with Justice Rehnquist
dissenting, that once a person is formally charged, the Sixth
Amendment applies. 152 In other words, Jackson held, once the
individual charged has requested counsel at his arraignment, a
waiver of counsel cannot thereafter be obtained unless the
defendant initiates conversation with the police. 153
In Cobb the State of Texas asked the Supreme Court to
overrule Jackson.154 The Court refused to do so, 155 and instead it
143 Id.
144 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 166.
145 Id.
146 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
'41 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167.
'41 Id. at 166.
149 Id. at 171-72.
I5o Id. at 173.
475 U.S. 625 (1986).
152 Id. at 632.
tId. at 636.
114 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 166.
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used the test from the double jeopardy cases, namely the
Blockburger test. 156 In Blockburger v. United States, 157 the Court
held that offenses are not the same if each requires proof of a fact
that the other does not.' 58 Proof of burglary and proof of capital
murder are quite distinct, and require proof of different facts.
Therefore, under Blockburger, and pursuant to the scope of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 159 the Court
held it is not double jeopardy to be convicted of burglary and then
later convicted of murder, since murder and burglary do not rely
on the same set of facts for conviction. 60 The Court said that the
same is true with respect to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 6 1  The dissent regarded the Blockburger test as
horrendous.'162 It said that for years, scholars have been harshly
criticizing the Blockburger test, so why make life worse by now
adding it to the Sixth Amendment? Well, as Justice Rehnquist
155 See id. at 174 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the Court has reached its
conclusion without the necessity to reaffirm or give approval to the decision in
Michigan v. Jackson. . . . ") (citations omitted).
156 Id. at 172-73 (referring to the rule of law articulated in Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), particularly, that "where the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not").
'57284 U.S. at 299.
'58Id. at 304.
159 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.... .
160 Cobb, 532 U.S at 174.
161 Id. at 173 ("We see no constitutional difference between the meaning of
the term "offense" in the contexts of double jeopardy and of the right to
counsel.")
162 Id. at 184-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting, "the simple sounding Blockburger
test has proved extraordinarily difficult to administer in practice. The test has
emerged as a tool in an area of our jurisprudence that the Chief Justice has
described as 'a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the
most intrepid judicial navigator. Some will apply the test successfully; some
will not. Legal challenges are inevitable. The result ... will resemble not so
much the Sargasso Sea as the criminal law equivalent of Milton's Serbonian
Bog... where armies whole have sunk'").
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said in Jackson, questioning people is very important. 163  The
result is a cutting back on the right to counsel.
Glover v. United States
The next case is Glover v. United States, 164 which
involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. At Glover's
sentencing, a probation officer recommended that the defendant's
federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion
convictions be grouped together under Federal Sentencing
Guideline 3D1.2,165 which allows for a grouping of counts if they
are substantially similar. 166  The government objected to the
grouping and the trial judge agreed. 167 As a result, Glover's
offense level was increased two levels and he received an
additional six to twenty-one months on his sentence. 168  His
attorney did not say anything. 169 There was no objection made at
trial, at sentencing, or on appeal. 170 Glover subsequently filed a
pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255171 to correct his sentence,
arguing that his lawyer was asleep at the wheel. 172 The district
court in Detroit said that the two-level increase under the
sentencing guidelines was not significant enough to amount to
163 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 638 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'64 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
165 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 Groups of Closely
Related Conduct (2000), providing in pertinent part, "All counts involving
substantially the same harm shall be grouped together in a single group."
1(6 Glover, 531 U.S. at 200.
167 Id.
161 Id. at 201.
169 Id.
170 id.
171 Glover, 531 U.S. at 201 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) which states in pertinent part that a prisoner in custody under sentence
of a court... claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or
that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence).
172 Glover, 531 U.S. at 201.
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'prejudice' under the rule laid down in Strickland v.
Washington.173 The Seventh Circuit agreed, and said that even if
Glover's counsel was ineffective, the increase in sentence was
insignificant. 174  This flippancy by the lower courts was
unbelievable to me; the judges do not serve the sentences, the
defendants do. In this case, the judge was essentially telling a
defendant that six to twenty-one months in prison is not a big
deal. 1
75
The question for the Supreme Court was: Was it a big
deal? If six to twenty-one months is not significant, then what
time frame would be significant enough so that the ineffective
assistance of counsel rule would apply. The Court refused to go
down that path and said: "Authority does not suggest that a
minimal amount of time in prison cannot constitute prejudice." 176
The Court held that prejudice resulted because Glover's attorney
failed to argue the point, and thus the Seventh Circuit had not
applied the Strickland test properly when it rendered its judgment
regarding the amount of the increase involved in the
sentencing.'7
Rogers v. Tennessee
The next case is Rogers v. Tennessee178 which, in my
opinion, ranks along with Atwater, as an unfortunate decision.
Rogers involved the retroactive abolition judicially of the
Tennessee common law rule known as the "year and a day
rule." 179 The year and a day rule provided that for a defendant to
be charged with murder, the victim had to die because of the
173 Id. at 202; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (A
defendant must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient, and




'78 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
' 79 Id. at 453.
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defendant's act within a year and a day of that act. 180  The
defendant, Mr. Rogers, stabbed Mr. Bowdery, however Bowdery
did not die until fifteen months later.181 Rogers was convicted of
murder, despite the year and a day rule and the fact that Bowery
died beyond a year and a day. 1
82
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the lower court's
determination that Tennessee's codified homicide statute had
abolished the rule.' 83  However, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reasoned that since the rule has been abolished in most
jurisdictions, and the reasons for recognizing such a rule no
longer exists, the rule is abolished as to Mr. Rogers' case.
1 84
What happened to the Ex Post Facto Clause? 85 The court made
something a homicide that on the day the crime was committed
was not a homicide under Tennessee law.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, with
Justice O'Connor writing for the Court, held that the Tennessee
Supreme Court's retroactive application of the decision abolishing
the year and a day rule was correct, since the Ex Post Facto
Clause only applies to legislative acts and not to the common law.
180 Id.
18 Id. at 454 (the victim had survived the initial attack, but had lost higher
brain function and fell into a coma for a prolonged period).
182 Id. (The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that "Tennessee's
Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 .... which abolished all common
law defenses in criminal actions in Tennessee, had abolished the [ year and a
day] rule.").
.83 Rogers, 532 U.S. at 455.
194Id.
185 U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl.1. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides in
pertinent part that "No State Shall... pass... ex post facto law[s]." There
are four types of laws to which the Ex Post Facto Clause extends: (1) every
law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action; (2) every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed; and (4) every law that alters the
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the
offender. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386, 390 (1798) (seriatim opinion of Chase,
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186 However, to so hold the Court had to distinguish Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 187 which seemed on all fours.
In Bouie, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court that had retroactively applied a
criminal trespassing statute to civil rights demonstrators. 88 The
statute made it a crime to enter upon the property of another after
having notice that the owner forbade it.' 89 The South Carolina
Supreme Court had extended the statute to cover the sit-in
demonstrators who had not been told by the owner of the
premises that they were unwelcome before they entered, but who
had remained on the premises after receiving notice to leave.190
That change in the construction of the statute, according to the
Bouie decision, was a violation of the Due Process Clause.' 9'
The Court said, "If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post
Facto Clause from passing a law, it must follow that a State
Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from
achieving precisely the same result with judicial construction." 1
92
In Rogers, however, Justice O'Connor labored mightily to
distinguish Bouie.193 First, she said that the language specifically
relied on by Rogers was dicta, 194 and second, she said that the
case is not the same as Bouie, because abrogating the year and a
day rule here was not "unexpected and indefensible," the
criterion laid out in Bouie.195 She said that it could be expected
because of advances in medical science, other states have
abandoned it, and because Tennessee's own courts had mentioned
abandoning the rule three times in dicta. 196 At the same time, she
'" Rogers, 532 U.S. at 466-67.
187 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
188 Id. at 349.
8 9 Id. at 349 n.1.
'90 Id. at 350.
191 Id.
'92 Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54.
193 Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458-59.
194 Id. at 459 (reasoning that since Bouie had been decided on Due Process
grounds, any language regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause was unnecessary to
the Court's decision in that case).
'9' Id. at 462.
'9 Id. at 463-64
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said that the Court does not mean to say that a defendant in State
A is on notice for what all other states are doing: only what his
own state is doing. 1
97
I cannot improve upon what Justice Scalia said in his
dissent:
Today's opinion produces,...a curious constitution
that only a judge could love. One in which (by
virtue of the Ex Post Facto Clause) the elected
representatives of all the people cannot
retroactively make murder what was not murder
when the act was committed; but in which
unelected judges can do precisely that.1
98
Justice Scalia then went on to explain what the Court had
gotten wrong; "the fair warning to which Bouie and subsequent
cases referred was not 'fair warning that the law might be
changed,' but fair warning of what constituted the crime at the
time of the offense." 199
Seling v. Young
In another Ex Post Facto/Double Jeopardy case, Seling v.
Young, the Court held that a sex offender, who had already
served out his prison term, could be subjected to civil
commitment under Washington State's sex predator act. 200 The
State of Washington's sex predator act, like many sex predator
acts, such as the one upheld in Kansas v. Hendricks,20' authorizes
civil commitment of "sexually violent predators;" persons
suffering from mental diseases which makes them more likely to
commit sex crimes and sexual violence.2°2 Right after Mr.
197 Id. at 464.
198 Rogers, 532 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (paraphrasing majority opinion at 532
U.S at 462-3).
200 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001).
201 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
202 Siling, 531 U.S. at 253.
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Young was released from prison, he was confined pursuant to the
civil statute. 20 3  After an unsuccessful challenge in the
Washington state courts, Young sought a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal courts.20
However, while Young's habeas was pending, the
Supreme Court decided Hendricks, and had upheld the
constitutionality of the Kansas statute in that case as non-punitive
and not in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses. 20 5 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for reconsideration in light of Hendricks, and to let Mr.
Young come in to show that in his situation he is really in prison
206again. He presented evidence that he was not getting anything:
no essential services, no psychiatrist; it was just like prison.20 7
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the law
did not violate Young's substantive due process rights or his
procedural due process or equal protection rights. However, it
determined that the statute, although a civil statute, as applied to
Young, was punitive, and therefore it violated the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.208
The only issue before the Supreme Court was
whether Young could raise an "as-applied" challenge to this
statute. 2°9 The Court held that because the statute is a civil statute
on its face, it cannot be punitive, thus Young was precluded from
challenging the statute under the Double Jeopardy Clause, even as
it applied to him.210




207 Seing, 531 U.S. at. 259.
20 Id. at 260.
2" Id. at. 262.
210 Id. at 262-63.
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Ohio v. Reiner
Of the remaining two cases, one, Ohio v. Reiner, is a per
curiam decision. 211 Reiner raised the issue of the scope of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the
Court is quite straightforward with its analysis. Here, a man was
charged with involuntary manslaughter for the death of his
two-month-old son.212 His expert testified at trial that the son,
who died from "shaken baby syndrome," could have been
injured by someone else several hours before he stopped
breathing.213 At that time, a babysitter was taking care of the
child during the day. The defense theory was that she had caused
the child's injuries.21 4 The babysitter informed the court that she
intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege at trial.21 5 The
prosecutor then requested that she be immunized, and the judge
granted her immunity.216 She testified before the jury that she
was immunized and that she had nothing to do with the child's
death.21 7 The jury found the defendant guilty, and, of course, he
was very upset because the jury knew that the babysitter had been
immunized, which suggested to them that the prosecution had
already determined that she was not involved.21 8 That obviously
didnot help to advance the defense's theory that someone else did
it.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the conviction due
to prejudice to the defendant, holding that if someone says she is
innocent, then she is not entitled to assert the Fifth Amendment
219privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court,
however, said that was an incorrect reading of the federal
precedents because the privilege is about protecting innocent
211 Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001).




216 Reiner, 532 U.S. at 18.
217 Id. at 18-19.
218 id.
219 Id. at 19.
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people, and if there is any chance that a person could be asked a
question that in any way could endanger him or her, then the
privilege applies.22° I think the case is worth talking about
because the Court has not spoken very often about how judges go
about measuring the privilege. It is a broad decision that gives a
wide swath of protection to the assertion of the privilege and
lawyers should be aware of it.
Shafer v. South Carolina
The last case, Shafer v. South Carolina, 221 is important
because it involves the death penalty. To understand Shafer, it is
important to understand Simmons v. South Carolina,222 which is
the background to the Shafer case. In 1994, the Court held in
Simmons that when the future dangerousness of a capital
defendant is put in issue, and the only available sentencing
alternative to the death penalty is life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be
informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole.223
In Shafer, under South Carolina law as revised, capital
jurors face two questions during the sentencing phase.224 They
are first asked whether the state proved one of the aggravating
factors to justify imposition of the death penalty. If the jury does
not unanimously agree that the state proved a factor necessary to
justify imposition of the death penalty, then it cannot recommend
the death penalty as a sentence and a sentence is then imposed by
the judge.225 In that case the judge has a choice of; (1) life
imprisonment, or (2) a mandatory minimum thirty-year prison
226term.2 6 If the jury does agree that the state has proved the
220 Id. at 20-21 (citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421-422
(1957)).
221 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
n2 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
223 Id. at 156.
224 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 40.
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necessary aggravating factors, then it must recommend either the
death penalty or life imprisonment.227 The sentencing alternative
of thirty-years to life is not an option for the jury.
228
Schafer's attorney argued that since the jury had found
the aggravating factors, the defendant was entitled to a charge as
to his ineligibility of parole pursuant to Simmons. 229 However,
the judge refused to charge the jury as to parole ineligibility,23 °
and the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the refusal on the
ground that a sentence of thirty-years to life existed as a third
alternative sentence in the new statutory scheme.231
I think any first-year law student reading that statute
would easily see that the thirty-years to life sentence could only
be imposed by the judge, not the jury. Therefore, in this case,
just as in Simmons, the jury had before it only two options; life or
death. But the jury was not allowed to be told that "life" means
life without the possibility of parole. During deliberations, the
jury asked the judge whether a person serving a life sentence
23could become eligible for parole. 232 He told them parole was not
for them to consider. 233 What was wrong with the judge? What is
wrong with the Supreme Court of South Carolina? The answer
rests with Justice Ginsburg's observation that "South Carolina
has consistently refused to inform the jury of a capital defendant's
parole eligibility status." 234 I say that if that is the way South
Carolina judges read statutes, then they have to go back to law
school.
So these, in my opinion, are the Court's most interesting
decisions this term in the constitutional criminal law area. For
the future, I believe that the events of 9/11 will prove very
important in many ways. It will be interesting to see what the
Court will do with such issues as checkpoints, racial profiling and
227 Id. at 41.
228 Id. at 50.
229 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 41.
230 Id. at 42.
211 Id. at 46.
232 id. at 44.
233 Id. at 46.
234 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 48.
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technological developments when these issues come before it in
various contexts that touch on post 9/11 concerns.
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